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1 
Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, and 
the Struggle for Marriage Equality 
Lawrence C. Levine* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Kennedy, in his near quarter century on the United States Supreme 
Court, authored the two most important decisions positively affecting the lives of 
gays and lesbians in the United States: Romer v. Evans1 and Lawrence v. Texas.2 
These two decisions were monumental in bringing gays and lesbians in the 
United States into the realm of constitutional protection.3 Rightfully, Justice 
Kennedy has been lauded for his thoughtful and sensitive gay-friendly 
jurisprudence.4 
Justice Kennedy’s key gay-rights decisions have been subjected to 
substantial criticism even by those favoring gay and lesbian rights, however. 
There are ambiguities in both Romer and Lawrence that have permitted lower 
courts to interpret these decisions extremely narrowly.5 Further, because of the 
 
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I had the opportunity to present 
a version of this Article at a McGeorge Law Review-sponsored symposium on April 6, 2012. I benefited greatly 
from hearing the presentations of the authors of the pieces that accompany this Article in this symposium issue, 
as well as from comments I received from several of participants about my piece in particular. I especially wish 
to thank Professors Arthur Leonard, Amy Ronner, and John Sims for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
Article. I want to thank my McGeorge research assistants, David Bass and Danielle Lenth for their invaluable 
assistance with this project. 
 As will become apparent in this Article, I neither believe that Justice Kennedy has joined some “gay 
agenda,” nor do I believe that any such thing exists. But Justice Scalia accused Justice Kennedy of doing just 
this—joining the “homosexual agenda”—in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  
1. See 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Court had decided other important gay and lesbian-focused decisions 
that have had a negative impact, the most notable being Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
2. See 539 U.S. 558. Throughout this Article, I largely (though not exclusively) use the term “gay and 
lesbian” although I am aware of the narrowness of the term. I do this because this language more closely tracks 
the language used by the U.S. Supreme Court in the opinions I reference above and for ease of expression. I am 
well aware of the impact of these decisions on, for example, bisexuals. See, e.g., Michael Boucai, Sexual 
Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415 (2012). 
3. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
4. The journalist Jeffrey Toobin, for example, noted that Justice Kennedy’s “opinions in the Colorado 
and Texas cases have made him the Court’s most visible defender of gay rights . . . .” Jeffrey Toobin, Swing 
Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, 
Sept. 12, 2005, at 51; see also FRANK J. COLLUCI: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND 
NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 123–26 (2009); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE 
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 93–94 (2009). 
5. See Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. 
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uncertainties raised in those opinions, the Supreme Court will be free to interpret 
both quite restrictively in subsequent cases while claiming adherence to stare 
decisis. Only time will tell how effective Justice Kennedy’s opinions will be in 
protecting the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians. 
The uncertainty about the reach and meaning of both Romer and Lawrence 
has become particularly problematic in the continuing debate about the 
constitutionality of the heterosexual marriage monopoly that currently exists in 
most states.6 Courts have interpreted Romer and Lawrence in dramatically 
different ways.7 Until the Supreme Court more clearly defines the reach of those 
decisions, this disagreement will continue. 
In this Article, I praise Justice Kennedy’s sensitivity and vision when it 
comes to gay and lesbian rights as no Supreme Court Justice has done more to 
provide constitutional protection to this community. That said, I also identify 
some of the problems created by the ambiguous nature of his opinions.  
The United States Supreme Court will likely weigh in soon on the ongoing 
debate about the constitutionality of banning gays and lesbians from marriage.8 
Many believe that Justice Kennedy will be the swing vote on this important 
issue.9 For these reasons, I endeavor, with no small amount of trepidation, to 
prognosticate on Justice Kennedy’s likely approach to the issue based on his 
existing decisions.  
 
L. REV. 913, 960–83 (2011); see also J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. L. 
41, 57–60 (2011). 
6. Before the November 2012 election, the institution of marriage was restricted to heterosexuals in 
forty-four states. Only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Iowa, Connecticut, New York, Vermont, and the 
District of Columbia permitted people of the same sex to wed. RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
WORLDWIDE, RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES, LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_recognition-of-same-sex-
couples-worldwide_3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). After the November 2012 election, the 
voters in three states—Maine, Maryland, and Washington—provided gays and lesbians access to the institution 
of marriage. Edith Honan, Maryland, Maine, Washington Approve Gay Marriage, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-gaymarriage-idUSBRE8A60MG20121107 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
7. Compare, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006), with Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).  
8. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 WL 3134429 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012). The Court may not reach the substantive issues as the Justices specifically raised the issue 
of standing. Id. Despite the different case name on appeal, this Article refers to “Perry v. Brown” rather than 
“Hollingsworth v. Perry,” due to the notoriety of the former case name.  
9. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515, 516 (1997) 
(noting “as Kennedy goes, so goes the Court”). Kennedy is often seen as the Court’s swing vote on many 
important legal issues. If anything, the perception of Justice Kennedy as the deciding vote has only gotten 
stronger. See Ilya Shapiro, A Faint Hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice Anthony Kennedy 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 333, 333 (2009) (book review) (“Anyone who has even a passing interest in the 
Supreme Court knows that, with the departure of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
became the Court’s one and only swing Justice.”). 
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The Ninth Circuit’s 2012 opinion in Perry v. Brown10 presents the Supreme 
Court the opportunity to jump into the marriage-equality debate in this current 
term. In Perry, the Ninth Circuit invalidated on federal constitutional grounds 
California’s Proposition 8, which had overturned California law permitting gays 
and lesbians equal access to marriage.11 As explained below, the Supreme Court 
review of Perry enables the Court to enter into the marriage-equality discussion 
without having to proclaim a far-reaching constitutional right to marriage for 
gays and lesbians while giving greater guidance on the reach of Romer.12 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court will ultimately have to confront the more 
difficult issue of whether the Constitution requires all states to permit gays and 
lesbians equal access to the institution of marriage. 
Part II of this Article examines Romer, while Part III analyzes Lawrence, 
noting each opinion’s positive attributes along with its shortcomings. Part IV 
looks at the recent Perry decision, as this case striking down California’s 
Proposition 8 may be the vehicle enabling the Court to enter the current 
marriage-equality debate. Part V looks at how the Romer and Lawrence decisions 
may influence the legal struggle for marriage equality. Finally, in Part VI, I turn 
to what those decisions suggest regarding Justice Kennedy’s likely perspective 
on the marriage-equality issue, concluding that neither Romer nor Lawrence 
foretell how Justice Kennedy will rule on a case presenting the issue. Justice 
Kennedy’s decisions conferring constitutional protection upon gays and lesbians, 
along with the potential that his due process liberty concept encompasses broadly 
defined relational choice, makes his support for marriage equality possible and 
maybe even probable. Time will tell. 
 
10. 671 F.3d 1052. As this Article goes to press, the United States Supreme Court has recently granted a 
petition for certiorari in this case under the name Hollingsworth v. Perry. 2012 WL 3134429. 
11. 671 F.3d at 1096. In this Article, I intentionally use primarily the term “marriage equality” in lieu of 
“same-sex marriage” or “gay marriage” for two reasons. First, I use “marriage equality” because it is the best 
way to highlight that this is a struggle for equal treatment in the marriage context and not about an effort to 
create some new and foreign institution. Second, in the context of this Article, marriage equality articulates the 
issue in the way that is likely most appealing to Justice Kennedy’s constitutional approach as it puts “tolerance, 
dignity, and responsibility,” over difference and group-based identity. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 16. 
12. Other marriage-equality issues will be heard by the Court other than those discussed in this Article. 
For example, during this term, the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), in Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-307, 2012 WL 4009654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012). Windsor raises the issue of 
whether the federal government may deprive federal benefits to those who are legally married under the law of 
their state. Id. While these cases do not require the Court to decide whether states must permit gays and lesbians 
access to marriage, they invite the Court to consider if there are acceptable justifications for treating some legal 
marriages differently than other legal marriages based on the sex and sexual orientation of the participants. 
Although a different issue, a Supreme Court decision upholding DOMA in this context would surely not bode 
well for the legal struggle for marriage equality. 
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II. ROMER V. EVANS—JUSTICE KENNEDY REFUSES TO ALLOW GAYS AND 
LESBIANS TO BE “A STRANGER TO THE LAW”13 
In Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy, writing for the six-Justice majority, 
determined that Colorado’s Amendment 2 violated the federal Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause.14 A majority of Colorado’s voters had approved 
Amendment 2, which sought to overturn existing state and local anti-
discrimination protections afforded to Colorado’s gays, lesbians, and bisexuals 
(such as bans on job or housing discrimination based on sexual orientation).15 It 
also sought to prohibit the state or state entities from enacting any such 
protections in the future absent another statewide initiative.16 Had the Court 
decided the case differently, the impact would have been an enormous setback 
for gay and lesbian rights; in many jurisdictions, a simple majority vote of the 
electorate would have successfully erased anti-discrimination protections for 
gays and lesbians. 
There is much to praise in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.17 Justice Kennedy 
begins powerfully by citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,18 in 
which Justice Harlan stated that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”19 By referring to the dissent of one of the most maligned 
 
13. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). For an interesting account of Romer v. Evans, see generally LISA KEEN & 
SUZANNE BETH GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL (2000). 
14. 517 U.S. at 635. 
15. Id. at 624–25. 
16. Id. Amendment 2 stated: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of 
Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, 
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or 
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any 
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the 
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.  
Id. at 624. There was some uncertainty about whether Amendment 2 would also affect laws of general 
application as they applied to gay, lesbian, and bisexual residents of Colorado. For example, it was unclear 
whether a lesbian who called the fire department due to her home being aflame could sue if the fire department 
refused to answer her call due to her sexual orientation. Justice Kennedy raised but did not resolve the question. 
Id. at 628. Justice Scalia in the dissent contended that Amendment 2 did not reach laws of general application. 
Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority found Amendment 2 to be unconstitutional even if its reach 
extended only to laws specifically protecting gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimination based on their 
sexual orientation. Id. at 633. 
17. Although, as discussed below, there has been ample criticism of the legal foundations for the 
opinion, Professor Akil Reed Amar praises the opinion as “an elegant blending of legal formalism and legal 
realism at their best.” Amar, supra note 9, at 530. 
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
19. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy has been lauded by many for not following the despicable “separate but equal” approach to the 
treatment of African-Americans. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan’s Dissent in 
Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 963–64 (1992). This remains 
true notwithstanding his highly offensive comments about Chinese immigrants. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, 
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discrimination cases in United States history, Justice Kennedy signals the 
importance of the issue before the Court and firmly places the struggle for gays 
and lesbians into the civil rights framework.20 
In strong and sympathetic language, Justice Kennedy lays out the pernicious 
impact of Amendment 2, which, as he explains, “withdraws from homosexuals, 
but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by 
discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”21 Further 
and importantly, Justice Kennedy debunks the common refrain that anti-
discrimination policies for gays and lesbians confer upon them “special rights.”22 
As Justice Kennedy pointedly explains: 
[W]e cannot accept the view that Amendment 2’s prohibition on specific 
legal protections does no more than deprive homosexuals of special 
rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon 
those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that 
others enjoy or may seek without constraint. . . . We find nothing special 
in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken 
for granted by most people either because they already have them or do 
not need them; these are protections against the exclusion from an almost 
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary 
civic life in a free society.23 
Throughout the brief opinion, Justice Kennedy notes the far-reaching nature 
of Amendment 2, which he views as “unprecedented in our jurisprudence”24 and 
not “within our constitutional tradition”25 because it refers to a group identified 
by a single trait and deprives them of “the right to seek specific protection from 
the law.”26 
In Romer, Justice Kennedy does not specifically determine the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply to the class at hand—gays and lesbians—because he 
determines that in light of Amendment 2’s “broad and undifferentiated disability 
 
J., dissenting) (stating that the “Chinaman” belongs to a “race so different from our own that we do not permit 
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States”). 
20. To this end, Romer is not just about unequal treatment of gays and lesbians but more broadly about 
discrimination of politically unpopular groups. See KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 108. 
21. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. Justice Kennedy uses the term “gay and lesbian” occasionally in the opinion 
though he used the term “homosexuals” more often throughout the opinion. Justice Souter was the first Justice 
to employ “gay and lesbian” in a Supreme Court majority in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
22. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.  
23. Id. Justice Scalia, for the three dissenters, adopts the “special rights” trope, noting that all 
Amendment 2 does is to prevent homosexuals from obtaining “preferential treatment without amending the 
State Constitution.” Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
24. Id. at 632. 
25. Id. at 633. 
26. Id. at 632. 
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on a single named group” and because of its “sheer breadth,” Amendment 2 
“lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”27 In a short paragraph, 
Justice Kennedy dismisses the state’s asserted bases for Amendment 2 (to not 
interfere with rights of association and to conserve resources to fight 
discrimination against other groups) by again noting that the “breadth of the 
amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that [it is] 
impossible to credit them.”28 In so doing, Justice Kennedy makes clear that at 
least in the context of laws limiting the rights of gays and lesbians, the state’s 
asserted bases to justify a law will not be taken at face value.29 
Justice Kennedy concludes that Amendment 2 must have been the result of 
animus toward gays and lesbians, which cannot serve as a rational basis.30 He 
ends with the oft-quoted and elegantly worded sentence: “A State cannot deem a 
class of citizens a stranger to its law.”31 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion reaches the important result of guarding gays and 
lesbians from majoritarian deprivation of anti-discrimination protection but does 
so largely through a creative and unusual cobbling together of case precedent to 
reach its ultimate result.32 Thus, Justice Scalia, in his biting dissent (which is 
lengthier than the majority opinion), has some basis for his claim that the opinion 
is “long on emotive utterance and so short on relevant legal citation.”33 Part of 
Justice Kennedy’s challenge in finding authority directly on point is that the U.S. 
Supreme Court majority approached the issue differently than the Colorado 
Supreme Court did in striking down Amendment 2.34 The Colorado Supreme 
Court invalidated Amendment 2 because it infringed on the fundamental right of 
gays and lesbians to participate in the political process.35 Justice Kennedy, to 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 635. Justice Kennedy’s application of rational basis does not accept the state’s asserted bases 
for Amendment 2 at face value. See id. Because he engaged in a more searching form of rational basis review in 
Romer, some scholars have determined that a heightened form of rational basis applies in cases dealing with 
discrimination against gays and lesbians. This has led to academic assertions that there may now be two forms 
of rational basis review: vanilla rational basis and rational basis with a bite. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–63 (2011). 
29. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (dismissing the state’s justification that Amendment 2 “does no more 
than deprive homosexuals of a special right”). 
30. Id. at 632. Justice Scalia lambasts the majority for failing to cite Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld 
the criminalization of same-sex sodomy based on the legislature’s moral disapproval. Id. at 640–42 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). With Justice Kennedy’s determination that majoritarian dislike of a group is not a rational basis, 
Justice Scalia surmises correctly that Bowers cannot be long for this world. See id. 
31. Id. at 625. 
32. See id. at 631–36. Justice Kennedy has support for his position that animus against a disfavored 
group is not a rational basis, however. Id. at 634 (citing Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 5287 (1973)). 
33. Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
34. See id. at 631–36 (employing an equal protection, rather than due process, analysis to reach the 
holding).  
35. Id. at 630–31. As the Colorado court explained: “the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution protects the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process, and that any legislation 
or state constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by ‘fencing out’ an independently identifiable 
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avoid getting drawn into the morass of political-participation cases, opted for a 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis instead.36 
Robust debate continues over whether laws treating gays and lesbians 
unequally should be subjected to some sort of heightened scrutiny.37 Because 
Justice Kennedy determines that Amendment 2 is not rationally related to the 
State’s alleged justifications, some interpret Romer as determining that gays and 
lesbians as a class should not be subject to any sort of heightened scrutiny.38 This 
is not a fair read of the majority opinion, as Justice Kennedy never discussed the 
issue of heightened scrutiny for gays and lesbians.39 Rather, he determined that 
Amendment 2 failed even a rational basis analysis, as it did not bear “a rational 
relation to some legitimate end.”40 Thus, the issue of what level of scrutiny 
applies to gay and lesbians remains unresolved. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer is so angry and acerbic that it is likely 
counterproductive.41 Justice Kennedy’s determination that animus toward gays 
and lesbians was the motivating factor behind Amendment 2 may well have been 
buttressed by the harshness of the Scalia dissent.42 In a case concerned with anti-
gay animus, Justice Scalia’s language could not help but drive a compassionate 
person such as Justice Kennedy to better understand the unacceptable 
mistreatment of gays and lesbians in American society.43 Thus, it has long been 
my view that Justice Scalia’s vitriol in his Romer dissent, though offensive and 
hurtful to many, has been something of a gift to those favoring the equal 
treatment of gays and lesbians.44 
There are so many offensive aspects of Justice Scalia’s dissent that I will 
limit myself to a few as a means of example. For starters, Justice Scalia belittles 
same-sex relationships by analogizing them to “long-time roommate[s],”45 he 
 
class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.” Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993). 
36. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–36.  
37. Compare, e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30 (Kan. 2005) (noting the Lawrence majority contains 
an “oblique” indication that rational basis should apply to homosexual persons regarding a Kansas unlawful 
voluntary sexual relations statute), with Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to the discharge of a military member under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” before it was 
repealed). Further, President Obama’s Department of Justice weighed in on the issue, concluding that “given a 
number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation 
should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.” Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United 
States, to Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
38. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). Justice Scalia, not 
surprisingly, adopts this interpretation of the majority opinion. Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 n.1 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
39. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 636–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
42. See id. at 632.  
43. See id. at 636–53. 
44. See id.  
45. Id. at 638. 
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likens gays and lesbians to murderers, polygamists, and animal abusers,46 and he 
mischaracterizes the political power and wealth of the gay and lesbian 
community.47 Indeed, as to this last point, evidence shows that gay men suffer 
poverty rates equal to heterosexual men, while lesbians suffer disproportionately 
to heterosexual women.48 The poverty rates are even more striking for same-sex 
lesbian couples and their children, with most instances demonstrating rates 
double that of heterosexual couples and their children.49 And, even if Justice 
Scalia’s point were true, suggesting that wealth, power, and influence support 
negative constitutional treatment has little relevance.50 He also attacks Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, labeling Justice Kennedy’s reasoning as bordering on 
“terminal silliness,” elitist, “facially absurd,” and without legal foundation.51 
While perhaps cathartic, none of this helps Justice Scalia to be persuasive.52 
The greatest challenge of Romer is trying to comprehend its reach. A fair 
read of Romer is that, absent a reason extending beyond dislike of the group, 
sexual minorities (and other disfavored groups) cannot be deprived of laws 
protecting them from discrimination by a popular referendum.53 But soon after 
Romer, it became clear that Justice Kennedy’s repeated references to the 
extraordinary and far-reaching nature of Amendment 2 would make it possible 
for lower courts to give a narrow interpretation to the decision.54 
Indeed, while Romer was pending before the Court, the issue of whether a 
law enacted by the Cincinnati City Council protecting gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals from various forms of discrimination could constitutionally be 
 
46. Id. at 644. 
47. Id. at 645–46 (stating that homosexuals have “high disposable income” and “political power much 
greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide”). 
48. See RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND 
BISEXUAL COMMUNITY (2009), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Albelda-
Badgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-Poverty-Report-March-2009.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
The UCLA study, which uses data from the Census Bureau, the National Family Growth Survey, and the 
California Health Information Survey to generate household income data for gays, lesbians, same-sex couples, 
and their children, concludes that “the myth of gay and lesbian affluence is just that—a myth.” Id. at iii. The 
authors advise that “access to marriage may improve LGB family incomes and lift some families out of 
poverty.” Id.  
49. See id. at 5–7. 
50. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 232 
(1996) (noting that while many of the same stereotyped criticisms have been attached to Jews, “[s]urely Justice 
Scalia would not allow Colorado to handicap Jews in elections”). 
51. Romer, 517 U.S. at 639, 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Surely, Justice Kennedy’s Romer decision prompted him to receive some amount of hateful, anti-gay 
mail. See KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 112 (noting that Justice Blackman sent a short note to Justice Kennedy, 
telling him the Lawrence decision “took courage” and to expect “a lot of critical and even hateful mail”). I think 
the likely level of mean-spiritedness only helps Justice Kennedy to see the very animus about which he wrote in 
Romer. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
53. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 108–12 (“The arguments that [Justice Kennedy] made could be applied 
to any ‘politically unpopular group’ that is discriminated against because of a bare majoritarian ‘desire to harm’ 
it.”). 
54. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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overturned by a popular vote of the electorate was working its way to the 
Supreme Court.55 When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court reversed and remanded the issue to the Sixth Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Romer.56 In joining Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas in dissenting to the majority’s reversal and remand, Justice Scalia 
shockingly contended that Romer was entirely irrelevant to the Cincinnati 
situation.57 Justice Scalia’s interpretation of Romer’s reach is both narrow and 
telling:  
Romer involved a state constitutional amendment prohibiting special 
protection for homosexuals. The consequence of its holding is that 
homosexuals in a city (or other electoral subunit) that wishes to accord 
them special protection cannot be compelled to achieve a state 
constitutional amendment in order to have the benefit of that democratic 
preference.58 
Although the meaning of Justice Scalia’s interpretation is as narrow as it is hard 
to discern, the Sixth Circuit understood it well enough to uphold the Cincinnati 
referendum even in light of Romer.59 The Sixth Circuit did this even though the 
Romer Court expressly avoided deciding the case on political participation 
grounds, using Equal Protection instead.60 
Even more troubling and relevant to the issues covered in this Article is the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning.61 The trial 
judge, relying on Romer, had determined that a voter-passed initiative amending 
the Nebraska Constitution to prohibit the state from recognizing same-sex 
marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships, was “indistinguishable” from 
Amendment 2 and, thus, invalid as a violation of Equal Protection.62 Seizing on 
Justice Kennedy’s language about the “unprecedented” scope of Amendment 2, 
the appellate judges found that an initiative that defines who may enter into a 
marriage or a similar marriage-like arrangement is far narrower in scope.63 
Accordingly, the judges found that no assumption of animus should arise and that 
 
55. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 128 F.3d 289 (1998). 
56. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996). 
57. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
58. See id. 
59. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 128 F.3d at 301. 
60. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996). In 2006, the voters of Cincinnati voted to 
reinstate and expand gay and lesbian anti-discrimination. Eric Resnick, Cincinnati Ready to Restore Human 
Rights Ordinance, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON. (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories06/ 
march/0310061.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
61. 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
62. Id. at 865 (citations omitted). 
63. Id. at 868 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). 
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the state’s asserted purpose of “encourag[ing] heterosexual couples to bear and 
raise children in a committed marriage relationship” was rationally related to the 
initiative’s purpose.64 
More recently, in Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Romer 
in determining that California’s Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution’s 
Equal Protection provisions.65 Whether that opinion is reconcilable with Bruning 
and consistent with the meaning of Romer is discussed below.66 The Supreme 
Court, should it reach the merits of the case, has the opportunity to determine the 
reach of Romer.67 Thus, the question remains: what is the proper reach of Romer? 
Just this year, Professor Kenji Yoshino noted that Justice Kennedy’s repeated 
references to the “unprecedented” scope of Amendment 2 could make Romer a 
“ticket good only for one day.”68 While Professor Yoshino is correct that the 
Court could interpret Romer that narrowly, I do not think that is a fair read of the 
opinion. I am more inclined to agree with Professor Knowles’ view: 
[E]ven a more narrowly written amendment—whose impact on the legal 
status of homosexuals was neither sweeping nor comprehensive—could 
not pass constitutional muster as long as it was underpinned by the same 
majoritarian, and morality-driven animus that Kennedy concluded was 
the only way to explain the existence of Amendment 2.69 
The question then becomes whether there is a non-animus basis to support the 
disparate treatment of gays and lesbians and the appropriate level of 
constitutional scrutiny. 
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS—THE END OF BOWERS AND THE  
CELEBRATION OF LIBERTY70 
It is hard to overstate the importance of Lawrence, although, on its face, it 
simply struck down the dozen or so state sodomy laws that still existed (and were 
rarely enforced) in the country.71 In powerful and empathetic language, Justice 
Kennedy humanizes gay and lesbian citizens by forcefully and directly 
 
64. Id. at 867. 
65. See 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).  
66. See infra Part III. 
67. Compare, e.g., Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (construing Romer narrowly), with Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 
(construing Romer broadly). 
68. Yoshino, supra note 28, at 778. 
69. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 110. 
70. See generally DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012). 
71. The sodomy statute at issue in Lawrence was one of four in the country that criminalized only same-
sex sodomy (Texas being joined by Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 
(2003). Thirteen states had sodomy statutes that criminalized heterosexual sodomy as well. CARPENTER, supra 
note 70, at 187. 
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overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.72 Justice Kennedy boldly states: “Bowers was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today,”73 adding that “[i]ts 
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”74 
Justice Kennedy understands that the reach of Bowers went far beyond the 
criminalization of certain sex acts.75 During the seventeen-year reign of Bowers, 
the decision was used to justify various forms of mistreatment of gays and 
lesbians, including banning gays and lesbians from military service, permitting 
discharge from employment based solely on sexual orientation,76 and banning 
gays and lesbians from adopting children.77 Under Bowers, the moral disapproval 
of the electorate, as evidenced by a majority vote of the legislature, was an 
acceptable rational basis for laws disfavoring gays and lesbians.78 
Actually, Justice Kennedy’s rejection of Bowers is not all that surprising to 
those who were attentive to his confirmation hearing and pre-Supreme Court 
speeches and case decisions. Although prior to Romer, none of Judge or Justice 
Kennedy’s decisions sided in favor of gay or lesbian petitioners,79 Justice 
Kennedy’s pre-confirmation decisions and speeches nonetheless suggested an 
openness to providing gays and lesbians some degree of constitutional 
protection.80 For example, in a case upholding the Navy’s right to discharge a gay 
sailor, then-Judge Kennedy suggested that had the case involved private, 
consensual sex in a non-military context, the case may well have been decided 
differently.81 Further, at his confirmation, Justice Kennedy did not hide his view 
 
72. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state 
statute criminalizing private, consensual oral and anal sexual conduct). 
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997). 
77. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, 
in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for failing to cite Bowers, making the somewhat 
persuasive point that if Bowers permits the criminalization of much of same-sex sexual expression, a state 
should be permitted to refuse to provide anti-discrimination protections to gays and lesbians. See Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640–44 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Romer then may have implicitly overruled Bowers 
although Bowers was never cited by the Romer majority. See id. at 623–36. 
78. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The lawyers working on the appeal recognized that 
getting the Court to overrule Bowers would not be an easy task. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 197. 
79. While on the appellate bench, Justice Kennedy ruled five times in cases dealing with gays and 
lesbians, each time ruling against the gay side. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN 
AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 377 (2001). Primarily due to his record, Justice Kennedy’s 1987 
nomination was opposed by gay organizations. See id. For example, Jeff Levi, on behalf of the National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force, testified against Justice Kennedy at the confirmation hearing, noting that “Justice 
Kennedy’s notion of justice is too narrow for him to be worthy of a role as a final arbiter of the meaning of the 
U.S. Constitution.” Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. Of the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 427 (1989) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearing]. 
80. See COLUCCI, supra note 4; KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 125; MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 79, at 
378–79. 
81. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980). “The reasons which have led the court to 
protect some private decisions intimately linked with one’s personality, see e.g. Roe . . . and family living 
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that the Constitution should be interpreted beyond its text, embracing due process 
protection for various forms of intimacy.82 Indeed, at his confirmation, when 
asked about the factors a judge should consider when determining the reach of 
the Constitution’s Due Process Clause,83 Justice Kennedy stated:  
[An] abbreviated list of the considerations are the essentials of the right 
to human dignity, the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the 
anguish to the person, the inability of the person to manifest his or her 
personality, the inability of a person to obtain his or her own self-
fulfillment, the inability of a person to reach his or her potential.84  
While these terms are broad and ill-defined, they foreshadow Justice Kennedy’s 
articulation of some sort of liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.85 
Lawrence provided Justice Kennedy the opportunity to build on his earlier 
comments about the importance of a constitutional protection of some sort of 
sphere of intimacy. Framing the issue as “whether the petitioners were free as 
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the 
Due Process Clause,”86 Justice Kennedy notes that the constitutional liberty 
interest extends beyond just a spatial component to “an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”87 
Justice Kennedy determines that it is an easy task to find that private, consensual, 
sexual conduct falls within this liberty interest.88 
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy sidesteps the traditional discussion of the right 
to privacy as a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny, perhaps marking a 
 
arrangements beyond the core nuclear family suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private 
consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge.” Id. (citations omitted). 
82. Kennedy Hearing, supra note 79, at 180. 
83. The line of questioning was in response to a question regarding “privacy” as then-Judge Kennedy 
saw it. Although he was asked specifically about privacy, Kennedy answered that he prefers “to think of the 
value of privacy as being protected by the liberty clause.” Id. at 121. 
84. Kennedy Hearing, supra note 79, at 180. 
85. See COLUCCI, supra note 4, at 13 (noting that unlike Bork, who is wedded to originalism, Justice 
Kennedy looks to “moral concepts embodied by the text of the Constitution . . . [to] provide the basis for 
determining the extent of the personal liberty that courts have a duty to enforce.”). 
86. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
87. Id. at 562. 
88. See id. at 578–79. In many ways, Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion is something of an homage to 
Justice Stevens, who assigned Justice Kennedy the task of writing the opinion. Justice Stevens in his Bowers 
dissent, a small part of which Justice Kennedy cites in Lawrence, wrote about the liberty interest invaded by the 
majority’s approach. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214–20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I must 
confess that I had long struggled with Justice Steven’s opinion, finding Justice Blackmun’s dissent more in line 
with the traditional thinking I brought to the issue. See id. at 199–214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice 
Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion has helped me to better grasp the sheer beauty and depth of Justice Stevens’ 
dissent in Bowers. 
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new direction of due process analysis for the Court.89 It is both elegant and 
frustrating; its parameters remain undefined. To some measure, Lawrence blurs 
the lines between Equal Protection and Due Process, shifting the focus to a 
different, and possibly broader, concept of liberty.90 In lauding Justice Kennedy’s 
approach in Lawrence, Professor Yoshino notes:  
The Court evaded the charge that it was picking and choosing among 
groups by highlighting that the right in question belonged to all persons 
within the United States. Lawrence was ultimately not a group-based 
equality case about gays, but rather a universal liberty case about the 
right of all consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy in the privacy 
of their own homes.91  
The reach of the liberty interest Justice Kennedy articulated in Lawrence, 
however, even by his own terms, reaches beyond private, consensual, sexual 
conduct. Citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,92 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “homosexual persons”93 are entitled to the 
same level of constitutional protection as heterosexuals when it comes to 
“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” and that homosexuals like 
heterosexuals have “the right to define [their] own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”94 The focus in 
Lawrence then was on sameness, not difference.95 Of course, the parameters of 
this ill-defined liberty interest remain to be determined. 
As in Romer, Justice Kennedy provides little discussion of the state’s 
asserted bases for the gay-focused sodomy law.96 Texas tried to provide a basis 
 
89. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. The case, of course, could have been resolved under the Equal 
Protection Clause as the Texas sodomy statute only applied to same-sex sexual expression. Indeed, Justice 
O’Connor in her concurrence elected to take that more traditional and narrower track by finding that, following 
the logic of Romer, the Texas sodomy statute that singled out only homosexuals for punishment violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it was only based on animus toward the group affected. Id. at 599 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring). 
90. See id. at 578–79; Yoshino, supra note 28, at 802. 
91. Yoshino, supra note 28, at 802; see also COLUCCI, supra note 4, at 22 (asserting that “[u]sing 
‘liberty’ in place of ‘privacy’ avoids a textual objection, and it brings moral and practical considerations to the 
forefront of constitutional adjudication”). 
92. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
94. Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
95. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 189. Indeed, the lawyers for the petitioners in Lawrence had 
hoped to highlight this perspective. See id. As Professor Carpenter explains: “To the extent that the members of 
the Court believed that what they were being asked to protect in Bowers was difference, they were less likely to 
grant it constitutional protection. To the extent that the Justices now believed what they were being asked to 
protect in Lawrence was sameness, they could perhaps be persuaded to extend it constitutional protection.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
96. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (discussing only the law’s text and the case’s procedural history 
before beginning his analysis). 
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for its law, claiming that Texas had an interest in “the preservation of marriage, 
families and the procreation of children” that transcended the moral disapproval 
of gay people.97 Having had the good fortune to attend the oral argument in 
October of 1995, I recall well that Justice Scalia was becoming increasingly 
frustrated at the lawyer representing Texas because he refused to take the 
position, ultimately taken by Justice Scalia in his dissent, that moral disapproval 
by the majority was enough of a rational basis to justify the law.98 Justice 
Kennedy rejected Texas’s asserted bases for the criminalization of same-sex 
sodomy; he found that the only believable basis was majoritarian moral 
disapproval, which could not serve as a valid justification for the law.99 
Further, as in Romer, Justice Scalia writes an angry dissent.100 He criticizes 
the majority for its failure to adhere to stare decisis.101 He condemns the 
majority’s position that the majoritarian belief that an act is immoral cannot serve 
as a rational basis for such a law.102 Justice Scalia contends that such a view 
portends the likely end to laws “against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity . . . .”103 
At its core, Justice Scalia’s dissent rejects Justice Kennedy’s move away from 
“fundamental rights” language to a focus on the liberty interest of the Due 
Process Clause.104 Justice Scalia adheres to the Bowers majority’s approach, 
requiring a finding that permitting same-sex couples to engage in private, 
consensual, sexual conduct must be either deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.105 He then, of course, rejects the 
notion that changing attitudes could influence an interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause, criticizing Justice Kennedy’s position that an “emerging 
awareness” is somehow relevant to whether the conduct in Lawrence merits 
constitutional protection.106 
Justice Scalia does raise a powerful criticism of Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion if one assumes it is based on traditional due process jurisprudence: if the 
 
97. CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles Rosenthal, 
the lawyer for Texas, at oral argument for Lawrence). 
98. See id. at 243–44. As an observer of the oral argument, I can say too that, though Justice Kennedy 
was an active participant in the oral argument, he was inscrutable; in no way could one discern Justice 
Kennedy’s position from the argument. 
99. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. For this point, Justice Kennedy cited the Stevens dissent: “[T]he fact 
that a governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
100. See id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
101. Id. at 586–92. 
102. Id. at 599. 
103. Id. at 590. 
104. See id. at 586. 
105. See id. at 593–94. 
106. Id. at 590. 
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majority is indeed finding some sort of fundamental right, even if going under the 
name of “liberty,” strict scrutiny rather than the kind of rational basis review 
employed by Justice Kennedy would apply.107 In this key way, Lawrence (and 
Romer) may represent something of a sea-change that has led some to talk in 
terms of a “rational basis with a bite” standard that is applied to gays and 
lesbians.108 While it is evident that Justice Kennedy did not use a highly 
deferential form of rational basis in Romer or Lawrence, it is also clear that the 
Court has yet to decide the specific issue of whether gays and lesbians are 
entitled to some form of heightened scrutiny.109 
But Justice Scalia’s dissent does more than disagree with the majority 
opinion.110 Just as in Bowers, the Scalia dissent “demeans” (to use Justice 
Kennedy’s term)111 gays and lesbians throughout.112 By likening gays and lesbians 
to those who commit incest, adultery, and bestiality,113 Justice Scalia brings to the 
fore exactly the kind of animus toward gays and lesbians that pushes a person of 
compassion in the opposite direction. Justice Scalia accuses Justice Kennedy of 
embracing “the homosexual agenda,” which seemingly includes the desire to be 
treated equally under the Constitution.114 
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy recognizes the humanity of gay and lesbian 
citizens.115 He grasps the broad and pernicious impact of sodomy laws and 
recognizes the autonomy and dignity of gays and lesbians.116 In essence, Justice 
Kennedy once again refuses to leave gays and lesbians outside the Constitution; 
he refuses for gays and lesbians to be a “stranger to [the] law[].”117 
Lawrence marks an important victory for gay and lesbian constitutional 
rights and Justice Kennedy gets there via a powerful and compassionate 
 
107. Id. at 586.  
108. See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 807, 
811 (2006). 
109. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.  
110. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111. See, e.g., id. at 525 (referring to Bowers: “Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons.”). 
112. See id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
113. Id. at 590 (noting “the impossibility of distinguishing homosexuality from other traditional ‘morals’ 
offenses”). 
114. Id. at 602. In the same way that Justice Scalia’s vitriol may have proven counterproductive, the 
highly offensive tone of some of the amicus briefs submitted in support of the Texas sodomy law may well have 
horrified Justice Kennedy and others by their venomous tone. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 204–06 
(discussing the Liberty Counsel amicus brief that asserted that the overruling of the Texas sodomy law was a 
part of a gay agenda designed to destroy families and religion using language from a satirical essay in a gay 
publication and other highly-offensive amicus briefs). 
115. As Professor Suzanne Goldberg put it: “[Lawrence] removes the reflexive assumption of gay 
people’s inferiority. Bowers took away the humanity of gay people, and this decision give it back.” CARPENTER, 
supra note 70, at 264 (quoting Suzanne Goldberg) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
117. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
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opinion.118 That said, Justice Kennedy employs an approach that is innovative, 
unorthodox, and largely ill-defined. As Professor Parshall explains: “Lawrence 
neither defined the liberty interest it protected as fundamental, nor clearly applied 
the traditional rational basis test associated with non-fundamental rights.”119 
While a departure from traditional due process analysis, Justice Kennedy’s 
approach in Lawrence has many positive attributes as well.120 For example, legal 
scholars have praised his liberty-based focus as being more inclusive and 
universal in its reach than the traditional privacy approach.121 Nonetheless, courts 
and commentators struggle with the actual meaning and reach of the decision.122 
Justice Kennedy’s unorthodox approach relying on a yet-to-be-defined 
concept of liberty has allowed lower courts to interpret Lawrence narrowly.123 As 
Professor Kelly Strader points out, because of the ambiguity in the applicable test 
and because of the uncertain reach of the concept of liberty, some courts have 
viewed the effect of Lawrence to not extend beyond rendering sodomy laws to be 
unconstitutional.124 In so doing, these courts have ignored Justice Kennedy’s 
determination in Lawrence that moral disapproval alone is not an adequate 
justification.125 
It is hard to imagine that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence and his 
conception of liberty are limited to a debate on the constitutionality of sodomy 
statutes.126 The opinion is rife with references to autonomy, dignity, and self-
 
118. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–79.  
119. Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Kennedy and the Concept of Emergent 
Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 238 (2005); see also Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to 
Professor Carpenter, 8 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1587 (2005) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion “strayed from 
seemingly well-settled due process doctrine”). 
120. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.  
121. Yoshino, supra note 28, at 803; see also Barnett supra note 119, at 1589 (while agreeing with some 
of the criticism of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, labels Lawrence “a ‘potentially revolutionary’ liberty-protecting 
case”). 
122. As Professor Cass Sunstein puts it: “Lawrence’s words sound in due process, but much of its music 
involves equal protection.” Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, 
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (2004); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916 (2004). 
123. Compare, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(construing Romer narrowly), with Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (construing Romer broadly). 
124. Strader, supra note 5, at 57–60; see also Rosky, supra note 5, at 966. 
125. Strader, supra note 5, at 43 (citing Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for 
Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1281 (2004)). For example, in a 
decision upholding a law banning the sale of sex toys, the Eleventh Circuit stated: “[W]e do not read 
Lawrence . . . to have rendered public morality altogether illegitimate as a rational basis.” Williams v. Morgan, 
478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). But see Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, in which the Fifth Circuit, relying 
on Lawrence, reaches the opposite conclusion, highlighting the ambiguity of the reach of Lawrence. 517 F.3d 
738 (5th Cir. 2008). Further, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a law banning the right of gays and lesbians to adopt 
children, Lawrence notwithstanding. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th 
Cir. 2004); see also Rosky, supra note 5, at 966. 
126. Justice Kennedy has raised this conception of liberty in various contexts including in the oral 
argument on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. Adam Liptak, The Patient Protection and 
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determination.127 That said, Justice Kennedy perhaps prudently and appropriately 
limited the reach of the decision to the issue before the Court: the 
constitutionality of Texas’s sodomy law.128 Future cases will further define the 
reach of Lawrence. Whether Lawrence portends Justice Kennedy’s support of a 
constitutional challenge to a law limiting marriage to heterosexuals will be 
discussed shortly. Before that topic, I will discuss briefly Perry v. Brown, as that 
decision provides the vehicle to bring the marriage-equality issue to the Court.129 
IV. PERRY V. BROWN—OVERTURNING CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 8 IN THE 
NAME OF ROMER130 
 The issue of marriage equality is now before the United States Supreme 
Court.131 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Perry v. Brown, in 
which the Ninth Circuit determined that California’s Proposition 8 (which took 
away the marriage rights that had been given to gays and lesbians by the 
California Supreme Court in May 2008) violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.132 
The Perry case crystallizes the debate about the reach of Romer.133 First, there 
is nothing surprising that a case involving a state referendum specifically taking 
away rights from gays, lesbians, and bisexuals would implicate Romer, despite 
the claims of some journalists that the opinion was some shameless attempt to 
curry favor with Justice Kennedy on a possible appeal to the Court.134 Both the 
 
Affordable Health Care Act, Appealing to a Justice’s Notion of Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at A1. 
127. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
128. See id. at 562–79. Indeed, the lawyer who argued the case for the petitioners before the Court, Paul 
Smith, made clear that they were asking the Court to “get rid” of sodomy laws and were not “worried about 
establishing a precedent for the eleven other things that came after that.” CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 197. 
129. See infra Part IV. 
130. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 
12-144, 2012 WL 3134429 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012). 
131. As mentioned earlier, constitutional challenges to DOMA are also before the Court. See supra note 
12.  
132. 671 F.3d at 1096. The Perry decision lays out the long and convoluted process that ultimately 
brought the issue of the constitutionality of Proposition 8 to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1066–68. In a nutshell, in 
May of 2008, the California Supreme Court determined California’s law limiting marriage to heterosexuals was 
unconstitutional under the California Constitution. Id. at 1067. Proposition 8 was passed by a majority of voters 
in November 2008, overturning by initiative the California Supreme Court’s marriage decision. Id. Before 
Proposition 8 was passed, however, over 18,000 same-sex couples were legally wed in California. Id. The 
California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under the California Constitution. Id. at 
1068. Plaintiffs, after being denied marriage licenses, filed a federal challenge, and in May 2009, after a twelve-
day bench trial, Federal District Judge Vaughn Walker determined that Proposition 8 violated the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. at 1069. In February 2012, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel hearing the appeal to Judge 
Walker’s decision agreed. Id. at 1052. In June 2012, the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear Perry. Id. at 1065. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari under the name Hollingsworth v. Perry. Id., cert. granted, 
2012 WL 3134429. 
133. See id. at 1080–85.  
134. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Gay Marriage Ruling a Memo to Justice Kennedy: Noah Feldman, 
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Perry majority and dissent agree on the relevance of Romer; their disagreement 
revolves around their interpretation of the reach of the Romer decision itself.135 
Perry provides the Supreme Court the opportunity to better define the reach of 
Romer. 
The Ninth Circuit majority went to great lengths to keep its decision 
California-centric, noting repeatedly that it was reaching its decision on the 
unconstitutionality of Proposition 8 in the specific context of a state that 
conferred equal marriage rights on gays and lesbians, then took them away via 
popular initiative, while maintaining its other broad legal protections for gays and 
lesbians.136 Sidestepping the controversial issue of whether the U.S. Constitution 
confers upon gays and lesbians an equal right to marriage, the majority held that 
“[b]y using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right 
that it possessed, without a legitimate reason for doing so, the People of 
California violated the Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment.137 
Or, as the court explained earlier in the opinion:  
We need not and do not answer the broader question in this case [of 
whether gays and lesbians have a constitutional right to marry] . . . 
because California had already extended to committed same-sex couples 
both the incidents of marriage and the official designation of ‘marriage,’ 
and Proposition 8’s only effect was to take away that important and 
legally significant designation, while leaving in place all of its 
incidents.138  
Whether the specific context so important to the majority proves to be a 
meaningful distinction in terms of federal constitutional law remains to be seen. 
But California’s near-equal treatment of gay and lesbian couples surely makes it 
harder to show that there is a rational basis supporting Proposition 8. 
 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-08/gay-marriage-ruling-a-memo-
to-justice-kennedy-commentary-by-noah-feldman.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
135. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1104–05 (Smith, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Romer and stating that it 
does not “directly” control). 
136. See, e.g., id. at 1076. Many thought that the narrowness of the opinion would make it less likely for 
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Jason Mazzone, Marriage and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down, 
BALKINIZATION (Feb. 7, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-thumbs-down 
.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). But see David Cole, Gambling with Gay Marriage, N.Y. REV. 
OF BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling-gay-marriage/ (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). However, the Court may well have decided to hear an appeal because the case 
raises issues regarding the reach of Romer and arguably conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s Bruning opinion. 
137. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096. 
138. Id. at 1064. 
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The Romer analogy was determinative to the majority; indeed in their view, 
Romer “compel[led]” them to strike down Proposition 8.139 The majority 
explained, freely citing Romer: 
Proposition 8 is remarkably similar to Amendment 2. Like Amendment 
2, Proposition 8 “single[s] out a certain class of citizens for disfavored 
legal status. . . .” Like Amendment 2, Proposition 8 has the “peculiar 
property” of “withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but not others’’ an 
existing legal right . . . that has been broadly available, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Constitution did not compel the state to confer it in the 
first place. Like Amendment 2, Proposition 8 denies “equal protection of 
the laws in the most literal sense” because it “carves out” an “exception” 
to California’s equal protection clause. . . . Like Amendment 2, 
Proposition 8 “by its very decree . . . put[s] [homosexuals] in a solitary 
class with respect to” an important aspect of human relations, and 
accordingly “imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone.” 
And like Amendment 2, Proposition 8 constitutionalizes that disability, 
meaning gays and lesbians may overcome it “only by enlisting the 
citizenry of [the state] to amend the State Constitution” for a second 
time.140 
The Perry majority quickly dismissed the Eighth Circuit’s Bruning decision, 
which upheld an even more far-reaching voter-backed constitutional initiative on 
the ground that Romer extended only to far-reaching initiatives, simply noting 
that “Proposition 8 is no less problematic than Amendment 2 merely because its 
effect is narrower; to the contrary, the surgical precision with which it excises a 
right belonging to gay and lesbian couples makes it even more suspect.”141 
Not surprisingly, the Perry dissent distinguishes the Proposition 8 challenges 
from Amendment 2 because of Proposition 8’s narrow reach.142 Thus, in the view 
of the dissenter, Romer did not command a finding of Proposition 8’s 
unconstitutionality.143 
Ultimately, the majority, relying on an exhaustive record created by the trial 
court,144 debunks all of the purported bases for depriving gays and lesbians access 
to marriage.145 Thus, based on the record, the majority concludes that, as in 
 
139. See id. at 1080–85. 
140. Id. at 1081 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
141. Id.  
142. Id. at 1104 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
143. Id. at 1097.  
144. The Federal District Court Judge who heard the Perry case required a twelve-day bench trial, 
complete with nineteen witnesses that led to a detailed and thoughtful opinion debunking all of the arguments 
made by Proposition 8 proponents and justifying the end to marriage equality in California. For a thoughtful and 
detailed discussion of the trial court’s opinion, see Rosky, supra note 5. 
145. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1092–95. 
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Romer, animus has to be the only explanation for the passage of Proposition 8.146 
Unlike in Romer, in which Justice Kennedy dismisses Colorado’s asserted 
justifications for Amendment 2 in one short paragraph, the Perry majority 
provides a detailed account of how the purported justifications for Proposition 8 
ring hollow, largely based on California’s still existing domestic-partnership law 
that confers the benefits of marriage on registered same-sex couples.147 
Perry provides the Court the occasion to weigh in on the marriage-equality 
issue in a limited context. The California-centric focus of the opinion may 
persuade the Court to decide the marriage-equality issue on narrow grounds.148 
V. ROMER, LAWRENCE, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S SUPPORT 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
Neither Romer nor Lawrence dictates the outcome of the marriage-equality 
issue. Romer is most relevant to an Equal Protection challenge involving a 
popular referendum on the issue of marriage equality.149 Whether Romer means 
that a State cannot, via initiative, ban gays and lesbians access to legal marriage 
absent a significant reason may find its way to the Court in the not too distant 
future, perhaps in the context of the Perry case. 
Likewise, Lawrence does not predetermine the outcome in a marriage-
equality case.150 Throughout the Lawrence opinion, Justice Kennedy made 
various references asserting that the reach of the opinion does not necessarily 
extend to the issue of marriage equality.151 Relatively early in the Lawrence 
opinion, Justice Kennedy, though noting with sensitivity the broad harm inflicted 
by sodomy statutes on gay people, adds “the [sodomy] statutes do seek to control 
a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the 
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as 
criminals.”152 Finally, near the end of the opinion, Justice Kennedy stresses that 
 
146. Id. at 1093. 
147. Id. at 1076–80. The dissent, in a temperately written opinion that notes how deferential the rational 
basis standard tends to be, finds that there are some plausible justifications for Proposition 8, such as promoting 
procreational responsibility. Id. at 1097 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
148. See Andrew Koppelman, Online Forum, Reaction: Salvaging Perry, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 69 
(2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/march12/forum_828.php (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit purposefully narrowed the “legal claim” of the case in an attempt to 
limit its application to California); see also Robin West, Online Forum, A Marriage Is a Marriage Is a 
Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 47 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/ 
issues/125/march12/forum_848.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision has been “widely lauded . . . by marriage equality proponents for its creative minimalism”). 
149. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
150. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
151. See id. 
152. Id. at 567 (emphasis added). Soon thereafter, Justice Kennedy adds that a state should avoid 
defining the nature of an adult relationship “absent . . . abuse of an institution the law protects.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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the case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition 
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”153 While this language 
can support the argument that Lawrence does not necessarily find that a liberty 
interest encompasses marriage equality, nothing in the majority opinion 
forecloses such a finding either.154 
That Justice Kennedy takes particular care to exempt the marriage issue from 
the reach of the opinion is no surprise for several reasons. First and foremost, that 
issue was not before the Court; the case involved the constitutionality of sodomy 
laws and nothing about the definition of marriage.155 Another reason that the 
Lawrence majority opinion does not embrace marriage equality is because the 
lawyers for the Petitioners went to great lengths to assure the Court that it could 
overrule Bowers without having to do so, asserting specifically that the case was 
not about “any right to affirmative state recognition or benefits.”156 
Only one Justice interprets Lawrence as resolving the marriage-equality 
issue—Justice Scalia.157 Justice Scalia bluntly asserts that Lawrence “dismantles 
the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made 
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in 
marriage is concerned”158 because he rather surprisingly accepts that the only 
reason for the disparate treatment is the moral disapproval of permitting gays and 
lesbians to have equal access to the institution of marriage.159 Justice Scalia 
concedes that encouraging procreation is not a believable basis for treating gays 
differently from straights in the marriage context,160 although many advocates of 
a heterosexual monopoly on marriage argue to the contrary.161 Indeed, none of the 
decisions in which a court has upheld restricting marriages to heterosexuals has 
done so based solely on the right of a majority to express their displeasure with 
the notion of gays and lesbians being permitted to legally wed, which to Justice 
 
153. Id. at 578. 
154. Professor Carpenter notes that in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy remains “agnostic” on the issue of 
whether “gays might aspire to formal recognition” of their relationships. CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 260. 
Justice Kennedy’s silence on the issue stands in contrast to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in which she 
strongly suggests that her Equal Protection-based opinion does not impose a state obligation of marriage 
equality. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “Texas cannot assert any legitimate state 
interest here, such as . . . preserving the traditional institution of marriage. . . . Unlike the moral disapproval of 
same-sex relations . . . other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval 
of an excluded group.” Id. 
155. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.  
156. CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the petitioner’s 
reply brief). 
157. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
158. Id. at 604. 
159. Id. at 605. 
160. Id. (stating that “encouragement of procreation” cannot be the basis “since the sterile and the 
elderly are allowed to marry”). 
161. Anderson v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006) (upholding the law banning gay marriage 
in part because it “furthers procreation, essential to the survival of the human race”). 
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Scalia would be an appropriate justification. But it is quite clear that Justice 
Scalia will not be siding with marriage-equality advocates any time soon, even 
though he believes that a constitutional right to marriage equality is preordained 
by Lawrence.162 While Justice Scalia’s Lawrence dissent discusses at length the 
impropriety of the majority’s rejection of stare decisis when it overruled 
Bowers,163 Justice Scalia admits that he does not “believe in rigid adherence to 
stare decisis in constitutional cases.”164 Surely, Justice Scalia will not feel bound 
to follow Lawrence. 
VI. THE LIKELY KENNEDY VOTE 
Neither Romer nor Lawrence, then, predetermines the result in a 
constitutional marriage-equality case.165 Similarly, these decisions do not provide 
a certain answer to how Justice Kennedy will vote when confronted with the 
marriage-equality issue. 
Justice Kennedy understands the impact that Romer and Lawrence have had 
on the lives of real people, and I have every reason to agree with Professor Pam 
Karlan’s gleeful pronouncement that Justice Kennedy knows and likes gay 
people.166 In contrast to Justice Powell, who, while struggling with how to vote in 
Bowers, famously proclaimed that he had never met a gay person even though he 
had a gay law clerk at the time he made that comment,167 Justice Kennedy’s close 
friendships have included gays and lesbians.168 While there is ample evidence that 
having close gay friends positively affects one’s attitudes regarding 
homosexuals,169 and while Justice Kennedy is a person of compassion,170 he will 
base his vote on same-sex marriage issues on his interpretation of the relevant 
 
162. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
163. Id. at 587. 
164. Id. 
165. See supra Part V. 
166. David. G. Savage, Gay Marriage Fight May Hinge on Supreme Court’s Anthony Kennedy, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/08/nation/la-na-marriage-kennedy-20120209 (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). Professor Karlan said of Justice Kennedy: “He is a California establishment 
Republican with moderately libertarian instincts. . . . He travels in circles where he has met and likes lots of gay 
people.” Id.  
167. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 79, at 272–75. 
168. See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME, June 7, 2012, 
at 28. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s close friend and mentor, Gordon Schaber, the long-time dean of McGeorge 
School of Law, was assumed to be gay by many people who knew him, though it was not a topic he and others 
discussed openly. Id. 
169. Michael J. Brown & Ernesto Henriquez, Socio-Demographic Predictors of Attitudes Towards Gays 
and Lesbians, 6 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RESEARCH 192, 195, 197 (2008), available at http://homepage.mac. 
com/psychresearch/Sites/site2/publications/manuscripts/brown_henriquez.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review).  
170. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 197 (referring to the “humane element of Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence”). 
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law, including his evolving definition of the meaning and scope of liberty.171 To 
be sure, judges cannot fully insulate themselves from their life experiences, 
upbringing, faith, and family,172 but I truly believe most, and Justice Kennedy 
particularly, try hard to do so.173 
How, then, will Justice Kennedy rule when confronted with the issue of 
whether it is constitutional to limit marriage to heterosexuals? To a large 
measure, the answer depends on how the issue is framed and when the issue gets 
to the Court. 
The Perry case provides an opportunity for the Court to decide a marriage-
related case and to do so in a somewhat narrow context.174 Ironically, Judge 
Reinhardt’s effort to draft a California-centric opinion in Perry, perhaps to 
minimize the likelihood that the case would be heard by the Supreme Court, may 
have enticed the Court to hear the case due to the narrowness of the issue. The 
Court would be able to take its first step into what will likely be an ongoing legal 
battle about same-sex marriage rights without having to grapple with the more 
controversial issue of whether the Constitution commands that all states permit 
marriage rights to gays and lesbians. Perry provides the Court the opportunity to 
decide the proper scope of Romer, currently very much in dispute.175 Until 
recently, there has been little desire to bring a federal challenge and Supreme 
Court appeal to these so-called mini-DOMAs out of fear that a bad ruling would 
be a major setback for gay and lesbian rights.176 Now that a case involving a 
 
171. My view that the Justices successfully put aside their own personal views when deciding cases may 
be overly optimistic, however. The public opinion of the Supreme Court is at its lowest point in recent history 
with three-quarters of the respondents in a recent poll stating that the Justices’ opinions are influenced by their 
political and personal views. See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% 
in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1. 
172. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8 (2010). 
173. Professor Colucci posits that Justice Kennedy’s “reliance on liberty and human dignity—criticized 
by Scalia as merely Kennedy’s personal preference—is likely inspired by his Catholicism.” COLUCCI, supra 
note 4, at 31. He specifically asserts that Justice Kennedy’s focus on human dignity in Lawrence is 
“characteristically Catholic.” Id. at 33. Professor Colucci then, with a quick reference, notes that Justice 
Kennedy conforms to the position of the Catholic Church in Lawrence by noting that the decision does not 
involve the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Id. at 34–35. If Justice Kennedy should decide against a 
constitutional requirement of marriage equality, he will not do so to conform to positions of the Catholic 
Church. Justice Kennedy is quite capable of adopting a constitutional interpretation that puts him at odds with 
the position of his church. For example, Justice Kennedy, despite his deep commitment to the Roman Catholic 
faith, has gone against church doctrine in the abortion context because of his interpretation of the Due Process 
Clauses. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
174. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
175. Compare Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (interpreting 
the reach of Romer narrowly), with Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (interpreting the reach of Romer more broadly).  
176. Koppelman, supra note 148, at 69 (noting that gay rights litigators such as Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders and the Lambda Legal Defense Fund “feared a premature appeal to the Supreme 
Court, generating a decision that same-sex couples do not have the right to marry”). A substantial majority of 
states have passed laws or constitutional amendments that seek to prohibit gays and lesbians from having access 
to the institution of marriage. Because of their similarity to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, they are 
commonly referred to as “mini-DOMAs.” 
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popular vote on marriage equality is before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy 
and the Court will have the opportunity to discuss the scope of his Romer 
decision. It is hard to imagine that Romer is as narrow as some courts, such as the 
Bruning court, found it.177 Justice Kennedy will not be quick to overturn the vote 
of the people, but he will do so unless there is an adequate showing made to 
justify the law just as he did in Romer. In light of Judge Walker’s exhaustive trial 
record debunking the asserted bases in support of Proposition 8,178 along with the 
detailed discussion by Judge Reinhart of the disconnect of those asserted bases in 
the California context,179 the Court may well decide the case on narrow grounds. 
Should the Court decide Perry on the merits, a strong case can be made that 
the only valid bases for Proposition 8 are the sort of moral and religious 
justifications that Justice Kennedy would likely find unacceptable.180 Like the 
California Supreme Court in the Marriage Cases,181 the Ninth Circuit majority in 
Perry determined that California gays and lesbians had the constitutional right to 
marry because the asserted bases to bar them from marriage rang hollow in a 
state that largely treats its gay and lesbian couples equally to its heterosexual 
couples.182 There does seem something peculiar about the fact that those states 
that treat their gay and lesbian citizens with dignity are those on which a federal 
constitutional requirement of marriage equality will most likely be imposed, 
while those states that are largely dismissive of the rights of their gay and lesbian 
inhabitants will avoid having to provide equal marriage access.183 
It seems inevitable that the Court eventually will have to confront the broader 
constitutional challenge to the laws of most states that restrict marriage to 
heterosexuals. Indeed, former Solicitor General Ted Olson, who, along with 
David Boies, is famously leading the federal constitutional charge against 
California’s Proposition 8, recently made clear that the goal should be for a 
 
177. As Professor Knowles explained, “even a more narrowly written amendment—whose impact on 
the legal status of homosexuals was neither sweeping nor comprehensive—could not pass constitutional muster 
as long as it was underpinned by the same majoritarian, and morality-driven animus that Kennedy concluded 
was the only way to explain the existence of Amendment 2.” KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 110. 
178. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
179. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052. 
180. See Rosky, supra note 5, at 983. 
181. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
182. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1076–77. 
183. See Will Ripley & Brandom Rittiman, Emotional Testimony Couldn’t Save Colorado’s Civil 
Unions Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 14, 2012), http://www.9news.com/rss/story.aspx?storyid=267940 (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). This somewhat perverse situation has not gone unnoticed. Recently, in an 
effort to prevent passage of a bill to permit same sex-civil unions in Colorado, the argument was made that 
doing so would be the precursor to the judicial imposition of same-sex marriage. See id. Brian Raum, attorney 
for the Alliance Defense Fund, argued in front of the State Affairs Committee that, “[a]chieving civil unions is a 
calculated step to achieving court-ordered same sex marriage. Opposing same-sex marriage while supporting 
civil unions is akin to the Trojans dragging a wood horse into the middle of Troy.” Id. Raum offered New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and California—where civil union proponents eventually filed for the legalization of same-
sex marriage—as proof. Id.  
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Supreme Court decision mandating all states to permit gays and lesbians equal 
access to marriage.184 Decisions by the Supreme Court striking down existing 
state laws on constitutional grounds, of course, are not unprecedented.185 They are 
often controversial, however. 
The Court in general and Justice Kennedy in particular believe in incremental 
steps.186 Indeed, in discussing Roe v. Wade at Columbia Law School, Justice 
Ginsburg recently stated, “It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too 
far too fast.”187 Justice Ginsburg seemed to suggest that the Court should have 
waited to decide such a contentious issue in order to give the states more time to 
work through it.188 The Justices, including Justice Kennedy, might find this 
sentiment persuasive, especially in light of the fierce debate currently raging 
about marriage equality.189 
While important, the ending of sodomy laws in Lawrence had a limited 
impact, as relatively few states had sodomy statutes and those that did rarely 
enforced them.190 The Supreme Court affected sixteen states when it struck down 
 
184. Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast May 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/47356785/ns/msnbc_tv-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/hardball-chris-matthew 
s-thursday-may/#.T-umj2iIn14 [hereinafter Olson Interview] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Mr. 
Olson analogizing the current struggle for marriage equality to the fight to overturn laws that restricted marriage 
to persons of the same race). 
185. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
186. Parshall, supra note 119, at 246 (“Romer was a spare opinion, only fourteen pages long and its 
failure to confront Bowers seemed a cautious effort to avoid addressing its continued legitimacy. Furthermore, 
Romer ‘represent[ed] an incremental, but important step in affording gay Americans the full benefits of the 
Equal Protection Clause.’” (quoting Katherine M. Hamill, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal Protection Gloss 
On Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REV. 655, 684 (1997)); see also, CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 196 (noting 
that “the Supreme Court is ordinarily a cautious, minimalist, and incremental institution”). 
187. Debra Cassens Weiss, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Decision Came Too Soon, ABA J. ONLINE 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_ginsburg_roe_v._wade_decision_came_too_ 
soon/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
188. See id. 
189. On May 8, 2012, the voters of North Carolina overwhelming passed a far-reaching voter initiative 
that not only bans same-sex marriage but also the recognition of other sorts of legally created relationships, such 
as civil unions and domestic partnerships. The next day, President of the United States, Barack Obama, 
expressed his personal support for the right of gays and lesbians to legally marry. The President did add that he 
believed that this was an issue for the states, however. Thirty-one states have had popular votes limiting marriage to 
heterosexuals. See Campbell Robertson, In North Carolina, Beliefs Clash on Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/in-north-carolina-gay-rights-not-a-simple-issue.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); see also Phil Gast, Obama Announces He Supports Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (May 09, 
2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-09/politics/politics_obama-same-sex-marriage_1_gay-marriage-civil-unions-
word-marriage?_s=PM:POLITICS (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Recently, a Nevada District Court judge 
held that limiting marriage to a man and a woman was a legitimate state interest and excluding same-sex couples is 
rationally related to that purpose. Sevcik v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL, 2012 WL 5989662 (D. Nev. 
Nov. 26, 2012). On the other hand, in the recent general election, the voters in three states voted to provide gays and 
lesbians access to the institution of marriage. Honan, supra note 6 (Maine, Maryland, and Washington). 
190. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
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laws banning interracial marriage,191 and the Court’s unanimous result could 
hardly have held much surprise in light of the civil rights victories that were 
taking place.192 Conversely, when the Court decided Roe v. Wade, only four states 
had completely repealed their antiabortion laws.193 Currently, fewer than a 
handful of states have full marriage equality; many states continue to struggle 
with how they will define marriage.194 Even many of the strongest advocates for 
marriage equality see the debate playing out at the state level. For example, in a 
recent MSNBC interview, Evan Wolfson, who has been fighting longer and 
harder for marriage equality than just about anyone, parted ways with Ted Olson 
and suggested a Supreme Court case at this point would be premature.195 Mr. 
Wolfson noted: 
[T]he President is also right that the way our country gets there is 
through a patchwork of struggle, in which some states advance further 
faster, other states regress and struggle. The country debates, and it 
creates a climate that enables the Court to ultimately do the right 
thing . . . .196  
A premature Supreme Court decision could lead to a decision harmful to the 
marriage-equality cause.197 
 
191. Loving v. Virigina, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395 (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
192. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down Florida’s prohibition on 
interracial cohabitation law just three years before the Loving v. Virginia decision). Public attitudes, however, 
did not support the Court’s decision. Public polling in 1963 had public support for bans on interracial marriage 
at sixty-three percent, yet public backlash towards the court was lacking after the Loving decision. Jane S. 
Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1153, 1155–56 (2009) (citing polling numbers from HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN 
AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 238–39 (rev. ed. 1997)). 
193.  Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue? 6 GUTTMACHER REP. ON 
PUB. POL’Y 8 (2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/1/gr060108.html#box (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). Alaska, Washington, New York, and Hawaii had repealed their antiabortion laws, 
replacing them with statutes allowing abortion when deemed necessary by the woman and her physician. Id.  
194. See LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 6. 
195. See Olson Interview, supra note 184. 
196. Id.  
197. For example, in the interracial marriage context, the Supreme Court first upheld a state law banning 
interracial marriage in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 483 (1956). As racial tensions grew after Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court waited thirteen years to invalidate state bars to interracial marriage 
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Perhaps as an incremental step, the Supreme Court struck down a state 
prohibition on interracial cohabitation to test the waters of the polity so-to-speak in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184 (1964). 
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The passage of time favors the advocates for marriage equality. Author 
Jeffrey Toobin noted in 2005:  
[Kennedy’s] opinions in the Colorado and Texas cases have made him 
the Court’s most visible defender of gay rights, but his support of gay 
marriage, a subject that many expect the Court will eventually take on, 
seems far from certain. In the Lawrence decision, Kennedy cited a 
consensus in “Western civilization” against punishing homosexual 
sodomy. But foreign traditions of tolerance for homosexual activity have 
not led to broad international support for gay marriage . . . .198  
That was nearly a decade ago, and the number of countries that join the four he 
noted has now expanded the count to eleven.199 Further, I believe that Toobin 
overstates the influence of what is done by most of “Western civilization” on 
Justice Kennedy’s decision-making.200 What is surely more relevant are the 
quickly changing attitudes on marriage equality here in the United States. When 
Toobin wrote his piece in 2005, approximately thirty-nine percent of Americans 
favored marriage equality.201 Now, some polls show that there is majority support 
for marriage equality with consistent trending in that direction.202 
 
198. Toobin, supra note 4, at 51. And there is the lesson of Bowers v. Hardwick, still very much in the 
minds of those advocating for gay and lesbian rights. See 478 U.S.186 (1986).  
199. LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 6. Since 2005, South Africa, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, Iceland, 
Portugal, and Denmark joined the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Spain in recognizing same-sex marriages. 
Several other countries (twenty-five) recognize non-marital partnership registration, including the United 
Kingdom, Israel, Germany, France, and Australia, to name a few. Id. Other countries appear to be moving 
toward marriage equality as well. See Andrew Potts, Colombia Debates Same-Sex Marriage Ahead of Deadline, 
GAYSTARNEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/colombia-debates-same-sex-marriage-
ahead-deadline240812 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Colombia is currently debating whether to 
expand marriage to same-sex couples.); Pablo Fernandez, Uruguay's Gay Marriage Law Approved by Lower 
House, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/uruguay-gay-marriage-
lower-house-approval-_n_2284377.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Legislation extending 
marriage to gays and lesbians is currently working through Uruguay’s legislative process.). 
200. See Toobin, supra note 4, at 51. 
201. See id. 
202. See Nate Silver, Gay Marriage Opponents Now in the Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://fivethiryeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/gay-marriage-opponents-now-in-minority (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); Frank Newport, Religion Big Factor for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage, 
GALLUP POLITICS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159089/religion-major-factor-americans-
opposed-sex-marriage.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing that fifty-three percent of those 
polled supported same-sex marriage). Indeed, support of marriage equality is far greater than the public support 
for interracial marriage was when the Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws. See Schacter, note 
192, at 1155.  
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Justice Kennedy’s conception of liberty might well include a constitutionally 
protected right to intimate relationships that are treated with equal dignity. As 
Professor Colucci puts it:  
Given [Justice Kennedy’s] broad ideal of personal liberty, his willingness 
to move beyond text and specific tradition . . . it is unlikely Kennedy 
would accept traditional disapproval and continuing disapproval by a 
majority alone as a sufficient state interest to override a law that 
interferes with an individual’s free choice and development of his or her 
own identity.203  
Justice Kennedy’s move to a liberty standard of inclusion rather than an equality 
focus grounded on difference makes it plausible that relational dignity for all 
could be the ticket to marriage equality.204 
VII. CONCLUSION 
One so inclined can criticize the unorthodox constitutional analysis and the 
uncertain reach of Justice Kennedy’s Romer and Lawrence opinions. Consistent 
with Justice Kennedy’s cautious approach,205 these cases simply did not go 
further than was necessary while strongly supporting the constitutional rights of 
gays and lesbians. 
 Romer and Lawrence are foundational cases in the ongoing struggle for gay 
and lesbian constitutional rights.206 Both cases, in often elegant and powerful 
terms, go far in restoring the humanity to gay and lesbian citizens that Bowers 
took from them.207 Justice Kennedy is acutely aware of how these decisions have 
affected the lives of real people. I venture too that a person as empathetic, 
thoughtful, and compassionate as Justice Kennedy is unsettled by the scorn and 
contempt to which gays and lesbians are often subjected simply because of whom 
they elect to love. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy recognizes the importance of 
the autonomy to make decisions regarding the formation of lasting and 
meaningful relationships and fully connects ending sodomy laws with the 
broader goal of human self-actualization.208 Following the logic of Lawrence, a 
state would seemingly have a heavy burden to show a valid reason for depriving 
 
203. COLUCCI, supra 5 note, at 22. 
204. See id. at 23; see generally Yoshino, supra note 31. 
205. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 253 (1998); Cynthia Gorney, A Cautious 
Conservatism; Judge Kennedy Lives by the Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1987, at A1. 
206. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
207. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
208. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
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gay and lesbian people of the right to form lasting and loving bonds in the same 
manner as their heterosexual counterparts.209 
Whether Justice Kennedy is ready to take the next step and join those 
Justices who would find the heterosexual marriage monopoly of most states to be 
unconstitutional is yet to be seen. Might he find that the concept of liberty 
enshrined in the Due Process Clause extends so far? Surely, there is reason to 
think that he will. 
As Justice Kennedy so beautifully put it in Lawrence: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty 
in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They 
did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to 
certain truth and that later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its own principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.210 
In light of the long history of evolving attitudes about the meaning of 
marriage, coupled with the Supreme Court’s clear support for marriage as a 
fundamental right211 and its privacy jurisprudence,212 it is not hard to imagine that 
the liberty interest enshrined in the Constitution would extend to the right of 
adults to form lasting and meaningful bonds. For a state to deem some of those 
relationships as lesser simply because of the sex of the participants requires some 
significant justification extending beyond tradition, morality, and general 
dislike.213 
 
209. See id. at 558. 
210. Id. at 578–79. Professor Colucci contends that Justice Kennedy’s “‘ideal of liberty’ . . . considers 
whether government actions have the effect of preventing an individual from developing his or her distinctive 
personality or acting according to conscience, demean a person’s standing in the community, or violate essential 
elements of human dignity.” COLUCCI, supra note 4, at 8–9. Similarly, Professor Knowles has noted that “the 
humane element of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence . . . protects an individual’s ‘right to search for’ the dignity 
that is central to his or her liberty.” KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 197. Surely, a right to equal access to marriage 
could fall within the liberty ideal, and the search for dignity, as defined by Professors Colucci and Knowles.  
211. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[I]nmate marriages, like others, are expressions of 
emotional support and public commitment.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“The right to 
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life 
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
212. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
213. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010). Surely if the Court is prepared to see that intimate sexual conduct is a central 
part of forming loving and meaningful bonds, providing equal access to the revered institution of marriage is an 
even easier sell. Rather than an undercurrent of sex which permeates sodomy statutes, marriage is largely about 
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The struggle for marriage equality will likely give Justice Kennedy the 
opportunity to define the reach of the liberty interest as it applies to committed, 
loving couples. And maybe the happy end of the story will indeed be “Liberty 




fidelity, commitment, and love.  
214. FRANCIS BELLAMY, THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE (1892). 
